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THE ANTI-AMERICAN CENTURY?
Ivan Krastev
The twentieth century was “the American century.” Championing de-
mocracy and capitalism, the United States won the Cold War and
emerged as the only global superpower—not only in military, but also
in economic, technological, and even cultural terms. The widening cur-
rency of the English language and the continued desire of millions
around the world to emigrate to the United States underlined the reality
of U.S. predominance. The future, it was said, looked like a country, and
that country was the United States of America.
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, however, sharply punc-
tuated the end of the American century. Indeed, the era we are now
entering may well come to be recalled as “the anti-American century.”
The rise of anti-Americanism around the globe is a distinctive feature of
the post–September 11 world. The expressions of anti-Americanism vary
from acts of terrorism against American citizens or property to dramatic
increases in the global public’s negative attitudes toward the United
States and its policies, as registered in the latest global polls conducted
by the Pew Research Center.1 Burning American flags, boycotting Ameri-
can commercial products, and mobilizing electoral support through
unrestrained anti-American rhetoric are common in many parts of the
world. Today there are two basic types of anti-Americanism: murderous
anti-Americanism and anti-Americanism “lite.” The first is the anti-
Americanism of fanatical terrorists who hate the United States, its power,
its values, and its policies—and who are willing to kill and to die in
order to harm it. The second is the anti-Americanism of those who take
to the streets and the media to campaign against America but who do
not seek its destruction. The first kind can be dealt with only by “hard
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power.” The second kind, however, must be better understood in order
to devise effective strategies to counter it.
It is becoming clear that anti-Americanism is not a passing sentiment
and that it cannot be explained simply in terms of the unpopularity of
the Bush administration or widespread hostility to the American-led
war in Iraq. There is a growing consensus that anti-Americanism is a
“master framework” with broad and flexible appeal, and that any seri-
ous attempt to analyze the phenomenon must encompass an
understanding not only of its various sources in different corners of the
world but also of the variety of purposes for which anti-Americanism is
used as a political resource.
Some observers rightly argue that anti-Americanism is not a new
phenomenon, but they often fail to grasp the importance of its present
reemergence. It can be argued that anti-American discourse has not
changed much, but what has significantly changed is the world. What
matters most is not that America suddenly has become hugely unpopu-
lar, but that blaming America has become politically correct behavior
even among America’ closest allies.
What is new is the way in which anti-Americanism is becoming an
instrument in post–Cold War politics. Decoupled from communism,
which gave it a certain strength but also placed limits on its appeal, anti-
Americanism has worked its way more than ever before into the
mainstream of world politics. In a sense, Francis Fukuyama’s “end of
history” has come to pass, with democracy and capitalism today lacking
powerful ideological rivals. But as we arrive at the end of history, we can
see anti-Americanism there waiting for us. It has turned into a conjurer’s
hat, where pieces of different ideologies, anxieties, and political strate-
gies come together to be recombined and recycled for a new life. The
appeal of anti-Americanism transcends Left-Right divisions, and it works
equally well with anxious governments and angry publics. It fits the
definition of an all-purpose ideology. What we are seeing is not so much
the rise of anti-Americanism in the singular as the rise of anti-American-
isms in the plural. Anti-Americanism assumes different guises in different
political contexts. It can even be a prodemocratic force, as it is today in
Turkey, though most often it is an antidemocratic rallying point, as in
Central and Eastern Europe.
Thus any attempt to find a global explanation for current anti-Ameri-
can sentiments is doomed to fail. The popular view that America is
hated for being hostile to Islam may have some explanatory power when
applied to the Middle East, but it is a nonstarter in the case of the
Balkans, where the United States is hated for being pro-Islamic and pro-
Albanian. In Islamic fundamentalist circles, the United States is
castigated for being the embodiment of modernity, but Europeans ac-
cuse it of not being modern (or postmodern) enough—for practicing
capital punishment and for believing too much in God. The United
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States is blamed both for globalizing the world and for “unilaterally”
resisting globalization.
The return of anti-Semitism in Europe and its interconnection with the
rise of anti-Americanism also can be interpreted in different ways. One’s
view of America usually reflects one’s view of Israel, and vice-versa. It is
easy to believe that many on the European Right are anti-American be-
cause America is perceived as pro-Jewish and pro-Israeli. This explanation
is more problematic, however, for the European Left, where it seems not
that anti-Semites have turned against America but rather that a profound
distaste for America has turned Leftists into anti-Zionists and anti-Semites.2
An Elusive Definition
The definition of anti-Americanism will always be elusive. The label
cannot and should not be applied to any vocal criticism of U.S. values or
policies. Opposition to the policies of the U.S. government surely does
not qualify as anti-Americanism. But opposing any policy simply be-
cause it is endorsed by the U.S. government comes close to being a
definition. The trick is to distinguish the sometimes subtle difference
between these two stances in real life and in real time. Anti-Americanism
is a systemic opposition to America as a whole. It is a critique of the
United States that transcends mere disagreement over specific policy
questions or government decisions.
The most obvious and logical way to define anti-Americanism would
be as opposition to Americanism. The problem is that when you search
for “Americanism” on www.google.com or on www.amazon.com, what
appears first is James W. Ceaser’s article “A Genealogy of Anti-Ameri-
canism” and Jean-François Revel’s book Anti-Americanism. In other
words, the current notion of Americanism is to a great extent the inven-
tion of anti-American discourse. The fact that any specific political
context and any political discourse can invent its own version of America
as a hate object gives anti-Americanism its irresistible charm.
The variety of its forms of expression further complicates the study
of anti-Americanism: Terrorist acts against American citizens, unfavor-
able verdicts in opinion polls, commercial boycotts, hostile campaign
speeches and media coverage, and graffiti on city walls all appear on the
menu of the day. But what are the policy consequences of these very
different forms of opposing America? Should the United States be more
concerned about countries where anti-American attitudes are prevalent
or about countries where the public is basically friendly but the govern-
ment is overtly anti-American? Terrorists do not require mass
anti-American sentiments in order to target American citizens, and there
is no certainty that negative perceptions of America registered in opin-
ion polls will have any political consequences.
Historically, dissecting anti-Americanism has been the business of
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the Right, and this has politically colored all discussion of the subject.
In the view of many on the Left, any focus on anti-Americanism is just
an excuse to ignore or discredit criticism of U.S. policies. For them,
“anti-Americanism” is a protest not against America itself but against
its apparent failure to live up to its own ideals. In the words of Chalmers
Johnson, “the suicidal assassins of September 11, 2001 did not attack
America . . . they attacked American foreign policy.”3 From this per-
spective, the only meaningful way of analyzing anti-Americanism is to
present a critique of U.S. foreign policy.
By contrast, for many Americans on the Right, the rise of anti-Ameri-
canism is a rejection of America’s civilization and style of life: “They
hate our values, not our policies.” In this view, a more pro-Arab U.S.
policy in the Middle East would not decrease the current levels of anti-
Americanism in the Arab world because Arab hatred is driven not by
what America does, but by what America is and stands for.  Left and
Right also take diametrically opposite views regarding the impact of
America’s military power on the rise of anti-Americanism. In the view of
the Left, America is hated for relying too much on its hard power. In the
view of the Right, it is America’s hesitancy to use its hard power that
stimulates the rise of anti-Americanism.4
What these two radically different perspectives share is a common
conviction that anti-Americanism is about America. But it is precisely
this point that is most questionable in my view. For both anti-Americanism
and the local responses to it are driven to a significant extent not by
concerns about America but by the intrinsic contradictions of
postideological politics. Anti-Americanism is becoming a defining
political issue in a world that is suffering not from a deficit of elections
but from a deficit of politics. Nowadays democracies are societies with
invisible enemies and unspoken dreams. Their economies may grow, but
people still do not feel happier. In many places in the world, voters feel
caught in a trap: They are free to dismiss governments, but they do not
feel that they can influence policies. As a result, conspiratorial fantasies
have replaced common sense as the basis for public deliberations. This
hollowness of postideological and postutopian politics, its subversive
dullness, is one of the major reasons for the seductive power of anti-
American discourse. People are against America because they are against
everything—or because they do not know exactly what they are against.
The latest surveys in Western Europe indicate an important change
in the profile of the anti-American constituency. The pattern long typi-
cal for France has now become common throughout Western Europe.
Elites have become more negative toward the United States than the
general public, and younger people are more critical than their elders.
Elites in search of legitimacy and a new generation looking for a cause
are the two most visible faces of the new European anti-Americanism.
In the aftermath of September 11, America was shocked to discover
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how hated it is in the Arab world, and Arab anti-Americanism became a
special concern of U.S. foreign policy. Yet it is anti-Americanism’s re-
surgence in Western Europe that has made this attitude a major factor in
global politics. Hence understanding the split within the EU over U.S.
policies toward Iraq is of critical importance for analyzing anti-
Americanism’s  political potential. A reexamination of the controversy
over the Iraq war helps to reveal that both the new anti-Americanism in
Western Europe and the anti-anti-Americanism of the new democracies
in Central and Eastern Europe have almost nothing to do with Iraq and
very little to do with America.
Europe and the Anti-American Temptation
Politics often demands the manufacturing of useful clichés. So when
British prime minister Tony Blair, in his July 2003 speech before a joint
session of the U.S. Congress, stated that the EU’s new members will
transform Europe “because their scars are recent, their memories strong,
their relationship with freedom still one of passion, not comfortable
familiarity,” he was practicing good politics. But good politics does not
always make for sound explanations. Some American conservatives were
even more persistent than Blair in stressing the “value dimension” in
the decision of East European governments to ally with the United States
regarding Iraq. The only problem with this analysis is that it is not
supported by the polls. Public opinion surveys indicated that there was
a strong antiwar majority (70 to 75 percent) in all the postcommunist
countries. The “coalition of the willing” was really a “coalition of the
reluctant.” The only difference between Sofia and Berlin was that in
Sofia the antiwar majority was visible only in the polls, not on the
streets. The conservatives’ reading of events was equally wrong with
respect to the motivations of East European elites. The “commitment to
freedom” argument may explain the support that the United States re-
ceived from former dissidents such as Václav Havel and Adam Michnik,
but it can hardly account for the behavior of the ex-communist govern-
ments that today run half of New Europe. “Commitment to freedom”
was never their trademark.
Washington’s opponents were quick to label New Europe’s falling
into line as “the march of the vassals.” In their view, the conspicuous
loyalty that these governments demonstrated toward the United States
was not much different from the loyalty that they used to display to-
ward the Soviet Union in the days of the Cold War. Far from a commitment
to freedom, it was the instinct of the vassal whose behavior is motivated
by carrots and sticks that explains the course taken by East European
governments. This interpretation is also difficult to justify. In terms of
power politics, France and Germany, with the European Commission
behind them, were able both to wield bigger sticks and to offer bigger
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carrots to the East European countries than was the United States. So if
the satellite mentality had really been at work, New Europe should
have gone “Old.”
In short, neither a commitment to freedom nor the satellite mentality
offers an adequate explanation for East European support for Washing-
ton. The real difference between Poland and France was their differing
judgments about the advantages and risks attendant upon encouraging
anti-American sentiments. Paris looked at the rise of anti-Americanism
and saw an opportunity for increasing French influence in the world.
Warsaw looked at the same phenomenon and saw a threat to all its hard-
won gains from a decade of arduous political and economic reforms.
The Anti-Anti-Americanism of New Europe
 The real cause of the division between Old and New Europe during
the Iraq war was the seductive charm of anti-American rhetoric for cer-
tain West European leaders. For New Europe, by contrast, flirting with
anti-Americanism was not simply in bad taste, it was politically danger-
ous. Postcommunist governments have important domestic political
reasons for worrying about the rise of anti-Americanism. The demo-
cratic and market changes that Eastern Europe experienced over the
past decade came wrapped in the American flag. When democracy came
to Eastern Europe, it was singing in English, it was in love with the U.S.
Constitution, and it was promoted by American foundations. For the
reformist elites in postcommunist countries, attacks on America ap-
peared politically (and not just symbolically) subversive.
Another major factor dividing Europeans was the conflicting lega-
cies of 1968. In Western Europe, the protestors of 1968 were openly
anti-American and in many respects anticapitalist. In their view, the
United States was “Amerika”—the very embodiment of imperialism and
capitalist exploitation. In the imagination of the 1968 generation in the
East, however, America was the symbol of democracy and the free world.
When German student leader Rudi Dutschke went on a solidarity tour in
1968 to Prague to ask Czech students to join in a common struggle
against capitalist democracy and the dictatorship of the market, Czech
students told him that this was exactly what they were struggling for. For
Western Europe, “the third way” was a road to escape from capitalism;
for Poles and Czechs, it was a road to escape from socialism. This differ-
ence in the socialization of many of the political and cultural elites now
in power in Europe led to their divergent reactions to the rise of anti-
Americanism during the Iraq crisis. Both Berlin and Warsaw remained
loyal to the legacy of 1968, but it is a legacy that divides East and West.
East Europeans were quick to realize that the recent wave of anti-
Americanism, celebrated by some of their Western neighbors as marking
the birth of a genuine European public, posed a clear and present dan-
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ger of delegitimizing the East’s reformist elites and reversing their poli-
cies. At a time when many people in postcommunist Europe have been
feeling let down by the “decade of change,” anti-American rhetoric,
once declared legitimate in Paris or Berlin, opens the door to populist
parties of both Left and Right. In the words of Ian Buruma, “European
populism historically almost always was anti-American.”5
 A June 2003 public opinion survey conducted by the Centre for
Liberal Strategies and BBSS Gallup International in five Balkan coun-
tries underlines the validity of Buruma’s point.6 In responses to this
survey, hostility to the United States correlates with hostility to mar-
kets and democracy, as well as hostility toward Jews. Those parts of the
public that are favorable to the United States are also the most
prodemocratic and the most favorable toward the EU. In the Balkans, in
contrast to Western Europe, it is the younger, better-educated, and more
active part of the population that most often expresses positive atti-
tudes toward the United States. Thus New Europe’s political elites
perceive the U.S.-EU rivalry as an extremely negative factor in their
efforts to reform their own societies. In the early 1990s, Eastern Europe
was ready to embrace democracy in large part because democracy was
associated with the American dream. Today many East European politi-
cians and intellectuals side with America because they understand that
in the local context the fashion for blaming America is opening the
door to attacks on democracy and the market.
Antidemocratic forces in the East, lacking any positive vision for an
alternative future and inspired by growing public criticism of the status
quo, see anti-Americanism as a catchall platform for protest-vote poli-
tics. The power of anti-Americanism lies in its very emptiness. For
politicians such as Serbia’s Vojislav Šešelj (who is currently awaiting
trial before a UN war-crimes tribunal at the Hague), anti-Americanism
provides an opportunity to recast the nationalist agenda at a moment
when Serbs are no longer ready to die for Kosovo or to kill for Bosnia.
For the old communist elites in countries like Bulgaria, the new political
correctness of anti-Americanism offers a way to reinsert themselves into
the democratic political landscape on their own terms. It is astonishing
to observe how many ex-communists in Eastern Europe embrace the
notion of Europe as the anti-America. For this new New Old Left, blam-
ing America is a strategy for pitting democracy against capitalism. For
some corrupt postcommunist governments, anti-Americanism is an in-
strument for redirecting public anger. For disillusioned publics,
anti-Americanism is a vehicle for expressing anger at their betrayal by
the elites. Although socialist solutions are considered dead in these
“end of history” societies, socialist attitudes are as alive as ever.  When
winning the protest vote is the name of the game, anti-Americanism is
the favorite tactic.
The anti-anti-Americanism of New Europe is usually perceived as
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simple pro-Americanism, but the failure to appreciate the distinction
between these two concepts can have grave consequences. Some political
circles in Washington flirt with the idea of using New Europe as an
instrument for dividing and weakening the EU with respect to foreign
and security policy. Such a strategy would be based on dangerously
unrealistic assumptions. The decision of almost all the new democra-
cies to side with the EU over the International Criminal Court should be
a sign to American policy makers that taking Eastern Europe’s support
for granted would be a major foreign policy miscalculation. For East
Europeans, backing the United States during the Iraq crisis was a tri-
umph of history over geography. But history itself teaches us that
geography is stronger in the long run.
Nonetheless, New Europe has strong political (and not merely senti-
mental) reasons to resist the tendency to make anti-Americanism the
foundation of a united Europe. For neo-Gaullists and die-hard social
democrats, Europe is the center of a new world that will confront America
in the same way that the old New World had confronted monarchical
Europe in the eighteenth century. In their view, anti-Americanism should
be the common European political language. Europe’s new democra-
cies do not share this view.
The problem with the European challenge to America is that Europe
sees this competition less as an opportunity for promoting its existing
model of welfare capitalism and more as a tactic to buy public support
for profoundly transforming this model in a more market-oriented di-
rection. The reality is that the EU is becoming less and less “European”
in terms of pursuing the welfare-state policies developed in postwar
Western Europe. It is striking to observe that when the EU supports
projects to promote economic development beyond its borders, it ex-
ports a version of the same type of neoliberal orthodoxy that it denounces
at home. New Europe’s rejection of the negative definition of European
identity supplied by anti-Americanism is its real contribution to the
European debate. United Europe needs a positive identity.
At present Europe and America are allies divided by common values
and common interests.
The Dangerous Charm of Anti-Americanism
There are strange functional similarities among the three discourses
that largely shape global politics today—antiterrorism, anticorruption,
and anti-Americanism. All three of them flourish at the end of history,
when no universal alternative to democracy and the market is in play,
but disappointment with democracy and the market is growing. Today
democracy may often be redefined or distorted but it is not openly
opposed. Antimarket and anticapitalist sentiments are enjoying a sub-
terranean resurgence, but on the surface they take the form of a debate
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between Joseph Stiglitz and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
What used to be a class struggle has now been reduced to a quarrel in the
faculty lounge. The three dominant discourses are “empty boxes,” eas-
ily filled with vague anxieties and cynically designed political
strategies; each is a response to the growing gap between voting pub-
lics and their democratically elected elites. All three discourses can be
used to criticize the status quo without incurring the odium of openly
attacking democracy or the market. Groups with totally conflicting pur-
poses can exploit all three to serve their own agendas.
When anticorruption rhetoric burst upon the stage of global politics
in the early 1990s, it was conceptualized as a way to mobilize support
for deepening market and democratic reforms. Anticorruption campaigns
were designed as a coordinated effort by civil society and the
international community (the World Bank, the IMF, and Western gov-
ernments) to pressure national governments into delivering good
governance. The anticorruption rhetoric shared by Washington and lo-
cal civil society actors was intended to answer the question of what had
gone wrong. Mass publics were ready to sign on. But the result has been
that political competition in many democracies is now reduced to a
confrontation between a government accused of corruption and an op-
position that claims to be slightly less corrupt. Anticorruption campaigns
have undermined politics understood as a matter of representative gov-
ernment and clashing ideas and programs. Far from contributing to a
narrowing of the gap between publics and elites, anticorruption dis-
course has enlarged the gap.
When terrorism captured the global imagination after 9/11, antiter-
rorist discourse was designed to highlight the common threat that would
help shore up the new world order. In fact, however, various govern-
ments have hijacked the antiterrorist agenda in order to destroy their
local political opposition and to gain control over civil society. Antiter-
rorist discourse has been skillfully used to foster suspicion of NGOs and
independent media and to curb civil liberties. Governments seized the
opportunity and started manufacturing terrorists. A successful mixture
of antiterrorist and anticorruption rhetoric, moderate anti-Americanism,
and old-style administrative politics has enabled Vladimir Putin to con-
solidate an “acceptable” authoritarian regime in Russia. This model has
the potential to be replicated. Governments that had found their freedom
of action modestly weakened by the spread of democracy and global
interdependence have used antiterrorism to bolster their control and
enhance the secrecy of their operations.
The impact of anti-American discourse is likely to be similarly harm-
ful to democracy. Washington adopted a high profile in promoting the
anticorruption agenda, attempting to bypass governments by telling
civil society actors that corrupt governments are the problem. In the
case of antiterrorism, Washington allowed discredited governments to
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label their domestic opponents as terrorists in return for support in the
global “war on terrorism.” In the case of anti-Americanism, govern-
ments are trying to convince frustrated publics that America is the
problem. The anticorruption drive was designed to promote the spread
of capitalism and deepen democracy. It failed. Antiterrorist discourse
was designed to rally the world around America. It failed. Anti-Ameri-
canism has emerged as a hostile response to America’s growing influence
but also to the spread of democracy and the global market. Unfortu-
nately, it has a chance to succeed.
American Responses to Anti-Americanism
In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the United States viewed
public diplomacy as the proper response to the rise of anti-Americanism.
A Council on Foreign Relations report declared that improving the U.S.
image through public diplomacy is directly linked to the country’s most
fundamental national security needs.7 Now the strategy has changed.
Aggressive democracy promotion is America’s current response to both
terrorism and anti-Americanism. Can it work?
It is true that the United States has been most popular and powerful
when it allied itself with the cause of democracy and freedom. This is
the lesson that America learns from its own history. But democracy
promotion can suffer collateral damage from the unholy struggle among
the discourses of anticorruption, antiterrorism, and anti-Americanism
that shape our world today. The threat of terrorism has already con-
fronted democratic societies with the need to renegotiate the borders
between civil liberties and public safety. Each society should answer
on its own the question of how much freedom it is ready to sacrifice to
have a better chance to defend itself in the face of the global terrorist
threat. The problem is when the answers are given not by society but by
undemocratic governments.
The new security focus in American foreign policy has resulted in its
inflating the democratic credentials of a number of tyrannies, begin-
ning with those in Central Asia. The way in which the U.S. government
handles the tradeoff between democratic performance and security co-
operation can antagonize democratic movements in some places and
become a real obstacle to promoting the democratic agenda. Washing-
ton paid the price for such policies in Latin America in the days of the
Cold War, and it is paying the price for such policies in the Middle East
today. Yet ignoring the reality of the terrorist threat is not an option.
The objective of combating terrorism through military and police coop-
eration and the objective of spreading democracy will remain in tension
and at times even in outright conflict.
The rise of anti-Americanism could become a major obstacle to pro-
moting democracy in the world. In the context of the new suspicion of
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the United States and its policies, many nondemocratic, semi-democratic,
or even almost-democratic regimes are tempted to criminalize any inter-
nal pressure for democracy, labeling it  “American-sponsored
destabilization.” The recent events in Georgia provide a classic illustra-
tion of this point. At the very moment when Georgians took to the streets
in defense of their right to fair elections, then-president Eduard
Shevardnadze was quick to label the popular movement an American-
inspired conspiracy. The strategy of authoritarian governments is to try
to force democratic movements to dissociate themselves from the United
States, thus isolating them and depriving them of international support.
For the United States, democracy promotion is a vehicle for winning the
hearts and minds of people around the world. But if anti-Americanism
can succeed in identifying pressure for democracy with “American im-
perialism,” this will undermine the prospects for the spread of democracy.
The transatlantic rift increases this risk. Guided by the understand-
able desire to protect themselves from the rising wave of
anti-Americanism, many European governments and foundations are
trying to distance themselves from American democracy-promotion ef-
forts in environments where there is strong antipathy to the United
States. This stance can jeopardize any chance for democratic break-
throughs in many parts of the world. The democratic momentum of the
1990s was possible because Europe and America shared a common de-
mocratization agenda; in many areas, their democracy-promotion
programs were coordinated. A trans-Atlantic divide in the field of de-
mocracy promotion will erode the very idea of internationally backed
democratization efforts.
America’s new commitment to spreading democracy will face an-
other critical challenge. The miracle of 1989 cannot be repeated. In
Eastern Europe, democratization gave birth to pro-American govern-
ments and pro-American societies. A similar result cannot be expected
in the Middle East or some other parts of the world. Iraq is not another
Poland. Faced with the prospect of the emergence of anti-American
democracies that present a security risk for the United States, Washing-
ton may be forced to trim its democratization agenda. But such a reaction
could have a grave impact on the politics of democratization as a whole.
It might result in the adoption of democracy-building strategies that are
“security-sensitive,” and where democracy is misconceived as a political
regime that can redirect and keep under control local conflicts, even if it
fails to provide much freedom. Introducing free elections into ethni-
cally divided societies is not equivalent to democratizing these societies.
Weak and nonfunctioning states are as much a threat to freedom and
human rights as the oppressive governments that they have replaced.
The Middle East will provide the stiffest test of whether U.S. democrati-
zation strategies can remain committed to the principle that democracy
also means an open society.
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What America has failed to recognize until now is that in many places
in the world the rise of anti-Americanism provokes the emergence of
anti-anti-American constituencies. Even when they disagree with U.S.
policies, these constituencies understand that less American influence
means less freedom, and that anti-Americanism is a stalking horse and
platform for antidemocratic and antimarket forces. This naturally emerg-
ing, homegrown anti-anti-Americanism offers the United States its best
means for countering the politics of anti-Americanism. In other words,
it is supporting democracy, more than exporting it, that constitutes
America’s best strategic option.
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